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On  22  November  2004,  consul  general  Raymond  Loretan  gave  a  speech  on 
Switzerland and the European Union at the European Union Studies Center in New 
York. He started with the words, ‘Switzerland is European’, followed by a long list of 
specifications on Switzerland’s Europeanness (Loretan, 2004).  
Some years ago no Swiss ambassador or scholar invited to an institution that had the 
word Europe in its name would have had to defend or even clarify Switzerland being 
European. There was no doubt the little Alpine country was the heart of Europe. But 
with the evolving political momentum of the European Union beginning with the 
Single  European  Act  (1986)  and  especially  the  Treaties  of  Maastricht  (1992)  and 
Amsterdam (1997) and the accompanying enlargement of the Community the notion 
of  European  became  subject  to  change,  became  appropriated  by  the  EU.2  Since 
Switzerland  is  not  a  member  of  the  European  Union  and  does  not  plan  entry  in 
foreseeable time neither it constantly has to explicate  its Europeanness. Although 
most of us can agree on Switzerland being European simply by the geographical fact, 
we  face  frictions  calling  the  country  Europeanised.  Reflecting  this  presumes  that 
Switzerland  (as  other  non-EU  member  states)  is  not  involved  in  the  process  of 
unifying  Europe.  But  to  take  this  view  shows  a  rather  limited  approach  to  what 
Europeanisation is and accounts for. 
In fact, as first brought up by Steppacher (1992) and later thoroughly analysed by 
Kux (1998), Church (2000[1]) and most recently by Fischer (2005), Switzerland is very 
much subject to Europeanisation no matter which of the various possible definitions 
(socio-political  uniformisation,  acceptance  of  common  values,  structural  and  legal 
alignment to the EU, etc.3) can be used, except one that is, however, the mainstream 
definition in political science: limiting Europeanisation as a matter of changes in the 
                                                 
2 That is why Radaelli (2003: 27) prefers to speak of ‘EU-isation’ and Kohler-Koch (2000: 21) uses the 
term  ‘EU-Europäisierung’.  Additionally,  Vink  (2003:  65)  points  out  that  politically  unified  Europe 
does not just consist of the EU but as well of institutions as the OSCE, EFTA or the Council of Europe. 
3 For an overview on the manifold and partially overlapping senses of the term ‘Europeanisation’ see 
for instance Harmsen and Wilson (2000), Olsen (2003) or Featherstone (2003).   4 
relations  of  the  Union  to  its  member  states,  or  even  as  the  de  jure  transfer  of 
sovereignty  to  the  EU  level  (Lawton,  1999:  91).  But  the  example  of  Switzerland 
questions  this  mainstream  definition  and  shows  that  Europeanisation  is  a  wider 
phenomenon than it is mainly taken to be.  
Kux  (1998)  revealed  first  that  domestic  institutional  logics  rather  than  formal 
membership are conducive to processes of adaptation in Switzerland and thereby 
challenged the importance of formal membership for Europeanisation studies. He 
published his findings in one of the few accounts on the Europeanisation of small 
states  that  defines  the  term  precisely  enough4  to  include  even  Switzerland. 
Considering ‘the adjustments made at the national level … in order to accommodate 
new situations’ (Hanf and Soetendorp, 1998: 2) as the main reference to define the 
process,  Switzerland  therein  is  subsumed  under  the technical  expression  ‘indirect 
Europeanisation’  (ibid:  5).5  But  pigeonholing  Switzerland  as  only  indirectly 
Europeanised misses the fact that the direct form of Europeanisation hits the country 
too by straightforward transmission mechanisms resulting from bilateral contracts 
between  Switzerland  and  the  EU,  as  pointed  out by  Fischer,  Nicolet  and  Sciarini 
(2004). Also Gstöhl’s analysis of Reluctant Europeans (2002) collaterally deals with the 
subject of Europeanisation and delivers thoughtful insights on Swiss-EU relations 
across five decades. 
Among  the  non-EU  members  there  are  indeed  many  intermediary  stages  and 
patterns of integration that prove that the concept of membership is just as little a 
dichotomy as the concept of Europeanisation is, and especially Switzerland displays 
an unexpectedly high degree of adjustment to EU-regulations almost similar to that 
of member states (Mach et al., 2003). The Union is among the main focuses of Swiss 
politics and economy, of debates in parliaments as well as at the regular’s table since 
                                                 
4 ‘Decision-making in the western European states is becoming more Europeanised in the sense that 
what  happens  now  at  the  level  of  the  European  Union  (EU)  penetrates  more  and  more  areas  of 
national policy-making’ (Hanf and Soetendorp, 1998: 1). 
5 The expression ‘indirect Europeanisation’ was coined by Radaelli (1997) to describe what he later 
(2000) called ‘policy isomorphism’ but what he unfortunately restricted to EU member states: Policy 
areas where (member) states have, to varying degrees, begun to emulate one another regarding to 
particular policy choices or regulatory frameworks.   5 
EUropean political trends transcend the borders along with people, goods and ideas: 
The EU consumes 63% of Switzerland’s exports and provides 82% of its imports,6 
70% of all foreign nationals living in Switzerland are EU citizens (let alone the high 
number of commuters), Switzerland is the  most important West European transit 
gate, etc.  
Given this, Switzerland is pulled into the EU-issue and is Europeanised whether it 
likes  it  or  not.  The  country  has  to  come  to  terms  with  an  evolving  polity  that 
redefines  Switzerland’s  political  activity  and  already  imposes  constraints  on  the 
much-admired and proverbial Swiss liberty that accounts for a strong part of Swiss 
identity.  Berne  was  eagerly  taking  pains  to  harmonise  national  legislation 
(particularly in commercial law) to bring it into line with the acquis communautaire in 
the  last  ten  years  (Linder,  2000:  8)  and  negotiated  a  set  of  bilateral  agreements, 
because – contrary to idealised portraits by EU-opponents – Switzerland was and is 
not  doing  so  well  outside  the  European  Union.  The  country  faced  continuing 
recessions,  huge  increase  of  unemployment  and  even  the  so-called  new  poverty, 
polarisation of politics, distrust of authorities and institutions, alienation of the classe 
politique and the people as did (and do) its neighbours (Church, 1996). 
But  being  a  small  country  in  the  middle  Switzerland  was  affected  by  European 
trends ever since. The amount of affection just rises accordingly to the increase and 
consolidation  of  internationalisation  (and  globalisation)  among  what 
Europeanisation now ranks first for Switzerland. Seeing Europeanisation as a special 
form  of  internationalisation  when  focusing  on  the  national  adjustments  to  the 
changing  requirements  in  bi-  and  multilateral  relations  (like  legal  harmonisation, 
modification  of  the  constitutional  order,  new  organisational  units  within  the 
government, etc.) to define the term, I will argue in this paper for a definition of 
Europeanisation that is not restricting the notion to the structures and the timeframe 
of the European Union.  
                                                 
6 2005-foreign trade data, taken from La Vie Économique (1/2-2007).   6 
Taking in Harmsen’s and Wilson’s (2000: 20) remark that ‘Europeanisation reminds 
as of the need for sustaining the study of the EU as an integral part of a broader, 
interdisciplinary European Studies, which is as interested in the issues of culture and 
identity  as  it  is  in  economic  integration  and  political  union’  I  will  expand 
Europeanisation to the historical process of European integration looking back at the 
antecedents of the European Union. Hereby, I will explicate that membership is less 
important than accorded, that Europeanisation affected current EU member states 
long before they had applied for membership, that it consequentially did and does 
affect countries like Norway or Switzerland that are not members of the European 
Union. 
Focussing on the little Alpine country I intend to show that Switzerland is not that 
special case (anymore) and overall less distinctive than commonly thought of. The 
country has a long history of affecting and being affected by the idea and later by the 
actions of European integration. Europe has always been a big issue for the Swiss, be 
it providing good offices and serving as a host for conferences on questions of trans-
European  importance  in  the  19th  century  or  discussing  the  future  United  State  of 
Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Switzerland and the history of its evolving relationship with the project of European 
unification  is  an  example  for  the  historical  and  present  relations  every  European 
country has with the European Union – even if it is not a member. Or in Church’s 
words, ‘(L)ike it or hate it, relations with the European Union are an inescapable 
question for all European countries. Whether members or not this is one of the key 
elements in their political agenda’ (1996: 17). Thus, Europeanisation is more than just 
meeting the membership criteria of the EU. 
 
Including History 
 
Although European Union studies finally overcame focussing on the dynamics of the 
European institution-building process (bottom up) only and are now analysing the   7 
impact of European integration on political processes of the single member states (top 
down)7 too by adapting Peter Gourevitch’s (1978) famous call to conduct more work 
on  how  the  international  system  affects  domestic  political  coalitions  and  their 
struggle for power, the prevailing concentration on formal institutional aspects of 
member positions and the neglect of historical insights on European integration lose 
sight of the bigger picture. Even quite broad concepts for defining Europeanisation 
that were proposed in the very early stages of studies in this area in fact allowed to 
include  non-member  states  but  nevertheless  stuck  to  the  contemporary 
developments  of  national  adaptation  when  using  the  term  for  describing  an 
‘incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree 
that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of 
national  politics  and  policy-making’  (Ladrech,  1994:  69).  Also  more  elaborated 
studies explicitly concerned with establishing a general research agenda for relating 
Europeanisation to domestic politics, policies and polities are mostly analysing the 
ongoing EU-related re-orientation of institutions and structures (Kohler-Koch et al., 
1998; Green Cowles et al., 2000).  
Knill  and  Lehmkuhl  (1997)  proposed  an  analytical  concept  to  approach 
Europeanisation by distinguishing three types of European policy-making (positive 
integration, negative integration, and ‘framing’ integration) which are characterised 
by distinctive mechanisms of Europeanisation. Most notably the latter and ‘weakest 
form’  that  ‘affects  domestic  arrangements  more  indirectly,  namely  by  altering  the 
beliefs and expectations of domestic actors’ (ibid: 2) holds something for the study of 
non-EU  member  states  and  their  history  with  European  integration  as  well  – 
although  this  aspect  was  not  indicated  by  the  authors.  Radaelli  (2000:  27)  in  his 
promising attempt to redefine Europeanisation for the purposes of political scientists 
concluded that ‘(i)f it does not confine itself to sui generis speculations and ad-hoc 
theorisation,  research  on  Europeanisation  has  considerable  potential  for  our 
                                                 
7  Only  in  recent  years  we  can  observe  a  growing  number  of  studies  dedicated  to  the  impact  of 
European  integration  at  the  national  level.  See  for  instance  Andersen  and  Eliassen  (1993), 
Mény/Muller/Quermonne (1996), Börzel (2001), Knill (2001) and Graziano/Vink (2007).   8 
understanding of the evolution of state structures and public policy.’ Unfortunately, 
he  himself  confined  his  approach  to  contemporary  analysis  overlooking  that 
Europeanisation is not only a Brussels based matter of our time but a sophisticated 
form of internationalisation on the European level that goes way back to times before 
1992. 
In order to understand the European project and the extent of Europeanisation when 
facing a future of even more differentiated integration we must pay attention to the 
fact  that  EU-related  decisions  on  the  national  level  by  member  states  and  non-
member states are as well shaped by historical experiences with the unifying Europe 
and by domestic legacies, an idea initially entertained by Olsen (1992), resumed by 
Gstöhl (2002) who combined an analysis of economic interests in market integration 
with ideational interests in protecting national identity, and applied to the Swiss case 
by Steppacher (2002). 
The process of Europeanisation did not start with the European Union. Numerous 
rapprochements and economically orientated organisations anteceded the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Yet more previous visions of European order even dating back to times 
before 1952 already included countries that still are not EU members and probably 
will never be. But their history with European unification can tell us much about the 
evolution of state structures and public policy. 
Arguing for inclusion of history in Europeanisation studies I primarily refer to the 
analyses of O’Leary (1987) and Featherstone (1998). In their respective studies on 
Ireland  and  Greece  (both  not  founding  members  of  the  EC)  they  used  the  term 
Europeanisation to describe the historical process of modernisation in these countries 
caused  by  a  unifying  Europe.  Therein,  Europeanisation  is  equated  with  bringing 
countries (back) into the European mainstream, with assimilation and normalisation.  
Especially, the tentative engagement of one country in the early times of European 
integration, its reasons for refusal of active participation in the evolving process and 
its  current  incremental  way  back  to  European  mainstream  delivers  insight  to  the 
hegemonic  power  (speaking  with  Gramsci’s  notion)  of  European  unification.   9 
Moreover, the example of Switzerland provides information on the multiple paths of 
European  integration  (whereof  differentiated  integration  and  indirect 
Europeanisation are part) and on the impact the choice at each parting of the ways 
had and has to the countries of Europe. Switzerland today may walk off the beaten 
track but it nevertheless is affected by what is going on on the European highway 
since  
‘Swiss domestic politics are closely related to outside developments. In fact it is very 
much the case that Swiss external policy, whether linked to Europe or beyond, is 
affected by internal constraints. Indeed, it has been said that Switzerland does not 
have a foreign policy, only a domestic policy aimed at preventing external events 
from disturbing the internal balance and status quo. This may be an exaggeration but 
it does highlight a key element of Switzerland’s relations with Europe# (Church, 2000 
[2]: 137).  
And it does highlight that Europeanisation neither was nor is a one-way process. 
The  initial  considerations  on  engagement  in  European  integration  and  the  later 
retraction  did  not  only  have  an  impact  on  Switzerland  but  they  affected  the 
European Communities as well and shaped their structures and policies. Including 
EC-historical and even pre-1952 developments in Europeanisation studies allows a 
more  thorough  analysis  of  the  motivations  and  courses  of  action  of  current  and 
future  member  states  that  were  (and  are)  influenced  by  the  establishment  of  a 
unified Europe long before they (had) applied for membership. European countries 
were and are geared to the ideas and actions of European integration no matter they 
want to or not, simply due to geographical reasons that entail political, economical 
and personal ties. 
Today  it  seems  like  Switzerland’s  adaptation  is  only  a  reaction,  ‘adjusting  to 
European rules without being able to share in making them’ (Church, 2000 [2]:142). 
But Switzerland’s refusal to join the union shapes some of the most important EU-
policies in return, for example transport and travel (esp. Trans-European Transport 
Networks TEN-T). For this reason bilateral agreements as negotiated in the last few 
years are not only in the interest of Switzerland that needs access to the European   10 
markets  but  good  relations  are  in  the  vital  interest  of  the  EU  as  well  – 
notwithstanding the EU’s better bargaining position.8 
 
For European Union Studies, insights on the Swiss-EU relations that are not limited 
to analysing recent connections but that include the historical perspective provide 
information on the multitude of possible forms of taking part in a unified Europe and 
of being Europeanised, thereby informing us about two matters: the adaptiveness of 
institutional  structures  and  the  necessity  of  keeping  the  process  of  European 
integration flexible by not playing down the impact the EU has outside its borders. 
The following paragraphs aim to give a brief historical overview of the impact of the 
European  issue  on  Switzerland  to  provide  the  basis  for  an  analysis  of  Swiss 
Europeanisation. 
 
A Role Model’s Duty and National Interest: Preparing for the USE9 
 
Kaelble  (1997:  88)  in  his  analysis  of  different  approaches  in  integration  studies 
pointed out the importance of the historical context focussing on the background and 
motives  of  getting  actively  involved  in  the  process  of  European  unification. 
Especially the Swiss example shows how extensively the idea of a unified Europe 
was and is utilised for the interests of domestic actors.  
The phrase Etats-Unis d’ Europe (United States of Europe, USE) was first publicly 
used  in the Paris journal Le Moniteur in February 1848 and the idea of European 
integration to a federal state with the USA – or Switzerland! – as the role model was 
seriously ventilated thereafter. Although sometimes not very thoroughly studied but 
rather  idealised  –  just  like  today  –  multilingual  and  bi-confessional  Switzerland 
                                                 
8 Despite the fact that Europeanisation runs in both directions and both are understudied concerning 
Switzerland I chose to primarily concentrate on the dominant, the downward causation in order not 
to go beyond the scope of this paper. 
9 Parts of this chapter are already published in German (Ehs, 2006).   11 
served as an example of the future Europe. The small state was assigned grandeur by 
outstanding thinkers of European integration like most prominently Victor Hugo,  
‘Once the day will come, on which the weapons will also fall from your hands, at 
that the war will seem as absurd and will be just as impossible between Paris and 
London, between Petersburg and Berlin, as it is impossible now between Basel and 
Zurich, between Glarus and Schwyz. One day will come, at which you, France, you, 
Russia, you, England, you, Germany –  at that you all, you countries of the mainland, 
will integrate to a higher unity, will unite as the cantons of the Swiss Confederation 
have  united  to  our  Switzerland,  without  losing  their  characteristics  and  their 
laudable features’ (Hugo, quoted from Rotten, 1942: 17). 
Swiss politicians used this appreciation to strengthen domestic cohesion also among 
those that were not so convinced by the new federal, more and more centralising 
state. They could build on a romantic sense of a mission that was derived from the 
Middle Ages and established as a collective national sentiment in the 19th century 
supported by the fact that Switzerland gained reputation as the country of liberty. As a 
consequence  the  assignment  of  acting  as  a  role  model  was  gladly  accepted  and 
constitutional concepts of how to unify Europe were drafted by Swiss scholars and 
politicians like Johann Baptist Sartorius, professor for constitutional law, and Johann 
Caspar Bluntschli, a jurist who also devoted himself to politics.10 Bluntschli (1853: 
131)  stated  that  ‘the  relevance  of  Switzerland  for  Europe’  lay  in  ‘it  serving  as  an 
exemplary model of the fraternisation of the Germanic and Romanic character and 
thus for the future brotherhood of the Germans and the French, on which depends 
the welfare of Europe’. Additionally, societies like the League for Freedom and Peace 
that was presided by Pierre Jolissaint, Swiss Ständerat (counsellor of States), acted in 
preparing for the USE. 
Especially  the  1870s11,  when  the  country,  as  the  ideal  neutral  place  for  coming 
together,  was  beginning  to  open  up  by  hosting  international  conferences  and 
providing  good  offices  in  European  conflicts,  mark  the  take-off  of  Switzerland’s 
commitment  to  European  affairs  on  the  national  level.  Herren  (2000:  257)  who 
                                                 
10 For further details see for instance Jílek (1990) and Ehs (2005). 
11 The 1870s were the post-war period of the Franco-Prussian War.   12 
analysed this Swiss internationalism says that it was a way for Switzerland to open a 
backdoor to power.12 Furthermore, she identified the unique Swiss way of ensuring 
domestic  cohesion  among  the  various  linguistic  and  confessional  groups  by 
protecting economic interests without provoking a conflict with the big players in 
world politics at its border. Therefore, the Swiss government was reluctant in playing 
a more active part in European unification that would imply more than economic 
integration. But these first tentative international activities on the government level 
and those plans issued by prominent actors of politics and civil society – no matter 
how  vague  and  unworkably  they  were  –  are  the  first  historical  evidence  for  the 
impact  of  the  European  issue  in  Switzerland  and  heralds  of  adjustments  at  the 
national level, first and foremost regarding Swiss foreign policy in the 1920s and the 
redefinition of neutrality towards warfaring nations. 
 
Trying Normalisation 
 
Absolute and permanent neutrality as fixed on the 1815 Vienna Conference had been 
the key to survival for Switzerland, situated in a region of belligerents in the age of 
nationalism (Ehs, 2005). But as a lesson drawn from the First World War the League 
of Nations was established (headquartered in Geneva) and Switzerland downgraded 
neutrality  for  the  first  time.  Between  1920  and  1938  the  country’s  foreign  policy 
experienced a complete novelty: differential, relative neutrality. Thereby Switzerland 
expressed its readiness to take part in economic sanctions if officially imposed by the 
League of Nations. 
This was a further step in the attempt to normalise and has to be seen in the course of 
the  country’s  opening  towards  is  neighbours  by  integrating  in  the  international 
system since the 1870s. But practice disproved theory: In 1935, the League imposed 
economic sanctions on Italy after the invasion of Abyssinia, but Switzerland – for 
                                                 
12 A first height of Swiss internationalism was the Swiss Federal Council’s and the ICRC’s role (then 
rather an important component of Swiss foreign policy than an intrinsic international institution) in 
the First World War, when Switzerland could gain diplomatic experience in European affairs.   13 
reasons of national cohesion with regard to the Italians – could not bring itself to 
punish Italy. Withdrawal from the League and return to integral, absolute neutrality 
was the result. Soon thereafter, the League of Nations turned out to be incapable to 
prevent war what strengthened the Swiss creed on neutrality. Since then ‘neutrality 
has moved from being a tool of policy to a defining and untouchable virtue linked … 
to national cohesion as well as to independence’ (Church, 2004: 278).13 
After these adventures into European mainstream official Switzerland only regarded 
the Sonderfall as a passable way. But something remained from the encounters with 
the European issue: a sense of a Euro-mission utilised to keep the country together14 
and  the  interests  of  business  people  and  intellectuals  to  stick  to  deepening 
internationalisation respectively Europeanisation. In June 1934, the Europa-Union was 
founded in Basle with the aim to promote the United States of Europe by giving the 
idea  Euro-wide  organisational  structures.  Henceforth,  the  Europeanisation  of 
Switzerland was tried by the civil society.  
 
Europeanised by Clubs and Societies? 
 
Between 1944 and 1949 Switzerland was the place to be for intellectuals from all over 
Europe that joined in to think about a better, more peaceful future.15 Already during 
the war, foreign resistance groups (headed by the Italian Altiero Spinelli) secretly 
met  in  Geneva  where  they  worked  out  a  plan  for  a  European  Federation.  In 
September  1945,  the  Europa-Union  Schweiz  invited  European  federalists  from  14 
countries to a conference in Hertenstein at the Lake Vierwaldstätter where the Twelve 
Theses for a Future European Union were written, also known as the Hertensteiner Rütli 
Oath. The selection of the venue had a symbolic sense: The Rütli is the mythological 
                                                 
13 On the issue of neutrality and army as identity related elements in Switzerland see also Haltiner 
(2002). 
14 See for instance Federal President Etter’s speech Die Europäische Sendung der Schweiz (Switzerland’s 
European mission) in January 1939 for the purpose of Geistige Landesverteidigung (spiritual national 
defense). 
15 For further details see for instance Grädel (2004), Ehs (2005) and Brückner (2006).   14 
lieu de mémoire for the foundation of the Swiss confederation.16 Relating Switzerland’s 
beginnings  topographically  with  the  beginning  of  the  European  Union  the  Swiss 
once  again  showed  their  sense  of  mission  to  serve  as  a  model.  Indeed,  as  a 
multilingual, federalist country, it represented a model for the European federalists. 
Yet, they were hardly interested in the detailed reality of the Swiss political system, 
as state Freiburghaus and Grädel (2005) by analysing a number of manifestos and 
programmes where they discovered that most political statements remained vague, 
throwing little light on how a future federal Europe might work. 
Albeit  issuing  vague  programmes  on  European  unification,  those  movements 
temporarily had a concrete impact on the Swiss system, accounting for a new trend 
in  civil  society:  Traditionally,  direct  democracy  offers  many  opportunities  for 
political  involvement,  and  associations  (like  shooting  clubs  or  choral  societies) 
played an important role in Swiss nation-building, operating within the domestic 
borders. But since the interwar years, more and more internationally acting clubs and 
societies emerged and developed para-party structures that questioned the official, 
reluctant European policy of Switzerland. 
Numerous  institutional  units  that  we  find  today  in  the  Council  of  Europe  or the 
European  Union  were  initially  discussed  in  Switzerland-based  societies  like  the 
Europa-Union Schweiz and the Union Parlementaire Européenne (UPE). The later’s most 
important outcome was the Plan of Interlaken (1948) that answered the basic question 
‘Should the European Union be federal or confederal?’ with a clear commitment to a 
federation.  
Other  European  societies  were  not  based  in  Switzerland  but  chose  the  neutral 
country that could provide an intact infrastructure as a venue for their conferences 
like the Union of Européenne des Fédéralistes (UEF) that was the umbrella organisation 
for about 50 European movements with more than 100.000 members. The UEF met in 
                                                 
16 The Rütli is a meadow that holds almost mystical significance for the Swiss. Legend says that it was 
here on August 1, 1291 that representatives from the three cantons around the lake Vierwaldstätter 
met to sign a pact of eternal mutual defence, thereby laying the foundation of the Swiss. Nowadays, 
1291 is taken as the birthdate of the nation, and August 1 is the official Swiss national holiday.   15 
Montreux in 1947 and drafted a constitution for a European federation, ‘une union 
des peuples autour d’un pouvoir federal efficace’. 
Despite those promising activities in European unification by the Swiss intellectual 
elite the Swiss populace could not be won over for the idea. Integral neutrality and 
keeping out of trouble had been a too successful strategy in international relations to 
give it up for a developing European Union. Moreover, the European communities 
that  were  founded  in  the  1950s  were  not  federal,  not  bottom-up,  not  direct-
democratic, not ‘une union des peuples’ – not Swiss-style.  
Though  contemporary  pro-EU  movements  can  revert  to  the  structures  and 
international relations of those interwar and immediate post-war societies their then 
impact on the Europeanisation of Switzerland was not lasting. They could not cause 
any  adjustments  to  European  mainstream  in  times  when  the  Sonderfall-thinking 
became dominant in Swiss foreign policy and the years from 1920 to 1938 were seen 
as an abortive attempt to normalise. But the Europeanisation of Switzerland went 
another way, a very EUropean way: economic integration. 
 
Europeanised by Economy 
 
Although Switzerland continued to subscribe to its principle of absolute neutrality 
on the level of European policy, the small, trade-dependent country integrated into 
the  Western  economy  system  with  remarkable  ease.  From  the  very  start  it 
participated in the European Recovery Programme (ERP, 1947), in the Organisation 
for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC, 1948), and in the General Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT,  1947),  even  though  always  under  reserve  of  its 
neutrality.17 Economic integration without political participation became the feature 
of  Swiss-European  relations  in  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century  (Tanner,  1990) 
which can be seen as the visible expression ‘of a wider Swiss creed of disengagement 
from international political involvement’ (Church, 2004: 269). 
                                                 
17 For further details on the years 1947 till 1960 see for instance Maurhofer (2001) and in general Gstöhl 
(2002) and Gabriel/Fischer (2003).   16 
Since the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and even more the European 
Economic Community (EEC) were regarded as a means of political integration and 
therefore incompatible with neutrality18, Switzerland along with six other countries 
founded the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in reaction as an alternative 
that in contrast to a customs union would not raise problems of neutrality, direct 
democracy,  or  federalism.  According  to  the  Swiss  Federal  Council  (1960)  EFTA 
membership would not lead to foreign judges19 and leave Swiss independence and 
liberty completely intact. – An analysis applying to direct Europeanisation via EFTA 
but  overlooking  indirect  Europeanisation,  because  despite  staying  outside,  the 
evolving political momentum of the European Communities caused adaptations in 
Switzerland like the creation of the Integration Office20 in 1961 and the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) of 1972.  
The  phenomenon  of  indirect  Europeanisation  was  raised  by  the  Swiss  Federal 
Council only in the year 1971, recognising that Switzerland’s interests went beyond 
trade because of ‘the fact that we would be affected to a considerable extent in many 
other areas by the decisions and developments in the EEC even if we were not to 
participate in the integration efforts’ (Swiss Federal Council, 1971: 103), and it was 
confirmed by the Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry when its president, 
Etienne Junod, wrote, ‘Switzerland’s foreign trade is very heavily dependent on the 
European markets, which make numerous commentators say that our country was, 
already, one of the most integrated in Europe’  (Junod, 1971: 31).  
For  years  the  FTA  became  the  fundamental  pillar  of  economic  relations  between 
Berne and Brussels, amended by several other agreements so that by 1992, the Swiss 
                                                 
18 This guideline on neutrality was already declared by the Swiss Foreign Ministry in 1954 in reaction 
to the ECSC, stating that, ‘an economic neutrality exists only in so far as the permanently neutral state 
may not conclude a customs or economic union with another state, since this would mean that the 
neutral  state  would  more  or  less  renounce  its  independence  in  political  matters  as  well’  (Swiss 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1954: 11). 
19 The term foreign judges is used as a quite populist equation of European integration with times when 
Switzerland was under Habsburg rule. 
20 Its main task was and is to improve the cooperation among different ministries concerned with EU-
issues, to monitor the European integration process and to analyse and assess its likely consequences 
for Switzerland.   17 
had about 190 mainly economic and technical agreements with the EC. By the loop 
way  of  economic  relationship  Switzerland  was  pulled  into  the  European  issue 
because the country had to open up towards Europe to sustain economic growth and 
prosperity  at  home.  In  the  course  of  economic  interests  Switzerland  directly  and 
indirectly was forced to adapt step by step. Even without being bound by contract 
the Swiss unilaterally adopted EC-regulations as far as they concerned the market. 
Furthermore, the Federal Council decided in 1988 that every new Swiss law had to be 
officially checked for EC-compatibility and stated awareness that ‘the renunciation of 
accession to the EC has an institutional price, which today undoubtedly carries more 
weight than in 1972: Switzerland is thereby excluded from the formal EC decision 
making process, a process by which, on the other hand, it is more and more affected 
as a result of the EC enlargements and the extension of EC competencies’ (Swiss 
Federal Council, 1988: 131). 
Corollary of this already existing degree of Europeanisation and since Switzerland 
faced continuing recessions and a huge increase of unemployment since the 1980s 
and  since  European  integration  became  more  Swiss-style  by  introducing  the 
subsidiarity  principle,  the  government  decided  to  accede  to  the  EEA  –  thereby 
backing Mattli’s (1999) statement that a country applies for (EU-) membership after 
one  or  more  years  of  growth  rates  below  the  average  of  the  member  states.  But 
Switzerland’s  application  for  membership  was  rejected  by  public  referendum  in 
1992.  
Since  then  the  Swiss  government  has been  aiming  to  obtain  similar  access  to  the 
internal  market  through  the  negotiation  of  bilateral  sectoral  agreements.  But 
accession to a market as huge and powerful as the European Union has its price: 
Most notably, the second series of bilateral agreements, signed in October 2004, do 
not only cover additional economic interests but extend, as demanded by the EU, 
cooperation – and therefore cession of former Swiss control to the EU – to the fields 
of internal security, asylum (Schengen/Dublin), the environment and culture, issues 
that highlight the advanced Europeanisation of Switzerland. And Europeanisation   18 
continues as show the next issues of interest, which could be negotiated quite soon, 
concerning the electricity market (regulating the cross-border transmission) or Swiss 
participation in Galileo21 or even an agricultural free trade agreement. 
 
The above briefly summarised history of Switzerland’s relations with the idea and 
process of European integration displays the Europeanisation of Swiss polity, policy 
and politics that is further analysed in the following. 
 
Analysis: How Europe matters to change (again) 
 
Looking at history delivers surprising insights: The present Swiss way of negotiating 
bilateral sectoral agreements and keeping the level of integration as low as possible is 
nothing  new  in  Swiss-European  relations.  It  is  the  pre-1992  strategy  adapted  to 
changed requirements. Switzerland has been concluding sectoral, intergovernmental 
agreements  with  the  unifying  Europe  since  contracting  with  the  ECSC  regarding 
supplies  in 1956. And current relations resemble Switzerland’s unrealised request 
from  December  1961  “for  a  form  of  association  with  the  EEC  that  would  leave 
neutrality,  federalism  and  direct  democracy  untouched”  (Swiss  Federal  Council, 
1962: 281) and the realised middle course between accession and isolation as signed 
in 1972 concerning the FTA. 
But since the EU changed from a mere economic area to a political entity covering 
policy areas such as justice and security or education the relations with Switzerland 
had to change too. The stepwise deepening of European integration since the 1980s 
challenged the political experiences of Switzerland since policy areas of exclusive 
cantonal domain became subject to European integration as analysed by Kux (1998: 
169),  ‘For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  Swiss  federation,  non-central 
governments became involved in international negotiations, which previously had 
been a prerogative of the central government.’ New layers of politics evolved and 
upset the federal balance because they have to interact with older ones making the 
                                                 
21 European Satellite Navigation System.   19 
political system more complicated and interlinked. Moreover, since a constitutional 
amendment  in  1977  that  gave  people  the  final  say  in  important  foreign  policy 
decisions22, Swiss EU policy is subject to direct democracy (Kreis, 1995) – an aspect in 
Swiss-EU relations that cannot be overestimated as the European issue accounts for 
the main reason of political division and the end of the Sonderfall. 
Given its geographical position, Switzerland is embedded into the EU’s policies be it 
concerning cross-border criminality, migration or transport. And due to the country’s 
highly export oriented economy it is quite easily convinced (a sharp tongue would 
say: blackmailed) by the EU to adapt to EUropean norms.  
With European integration on the political agenda (again) an element in the Swiss 
political system re-emerged that had already been active before: extra-parliamentary 
movements. Reanimating the Europa-Union, the NEBS23 was constituted in 1998 by 
pooling together a number of pro-European movements.24 But what has changed is 
that most of the newly established campaigning organisations are not supporting but 
opposing EU entry like most prominently the AUNS25, indiscriminately arguing with 
simple emotive issues like the loss of Swiss liberty as the populist line of reasoning. 
For EU-philes and EU-phobes alike and to a certain regard also for EU-sceptics in the 
middle,26 the European Union is the other, utilised to meet Swiss domestic political 
and cultural conflicts. According to Kux (1998: 179) ‘the emergence of these para-
party structures means that political conflicts can no longer be resolved within the 
traditional  institutions,  but  are  decided  at  the  ballot’  entailing  a  shift  from 
representative to direct democratic decision-making in European affairs as well as 
higher  competition  among  the  parties  and  general  polarisation  of  politics  –  a 
                                                 
22 Accession to organisations for collective security (e.g. UNO) and to supranational communities (e.g. 
the EC) was made subject to mandatory referendum. 
23 NEBS – New European Movement Switzerland: http://www.europa.ch/ 
24  A  fact  obviously  ignored  by  Flood  (2002)  who  thinks  of  Switzerland  not  being  in  need  of  a 
campaigning anti-EU force because to him the country has an anti-European consensus. 
25 AUNS, engl. CINS – Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland: http://www.cins.ch/ 
26 On this tripartite distinction see Church (2004: 270).   20 
decrease  of  consensus  and  concordance  that  meanwhile  already  affected  the 
composition of the magic formula.27  
Europeanisation  is  used  by  domestic  politicians  and  interest  groups  as  an 
opportunity to further their goals and hereby accounts for a changed empowerment 
of  actors  and  a  redistribution  of  power  (Green-Cowles,  2000:  11)  as  Switzerland 
recently experienced with Christoph Blocher’s SVP (Swiss People’s Party) and the 
just mentioned change in the magic formula. As in every other European country – 
whether EU member or not – the process of European integration spurs to mobilise 
politics. 
To  avoid  even  further  division  among  the  linguistic  groups  (French  cantons  are 
mainly  pro  EU,  German  ones  opposing  it)28  the  government  recently  completely 
withdrew from being committed to full EU membership as the long-term objective in 
its  Europe  Report  2006.  For  the  first  time,  this  report  lists  the  possibility  of 
differentiated  integration  for  Switzerland  as  a  serious  option.  Assessing  that 
‘European integration has always been a process, and it is set to remain one’ and 
‘(c)onsidering the major works in progress in the EU today [Constitutional Treaty, 
further enlargement], the process of European integration is more open than it has 
been at any time in the past’ (Europe Report 2006: 11), Switzerland is shown as an 
example for flexible differentiated integration. 
Having  withdrawn  from  first  tentative,  civil-society  based  direct  and  active 
involvement  in  helping  to  unify  Europe  in  the  1940s  the  Swiss  had  only  sought 
economic  cooperation  thereafter,  ‘a  very  satisfactory  relationship  with  Europe’ 
because  ‘(t)his  gave  them  the  economic  benefits  they  needed  without  demanding 
clear political commitment’ (Church, 1996: 13). Accordingly, the Swiss Integration 
                                                 
27 The magic formula guaranteed all four main parties power in a grand coalition, regardless of the 
election  result  by  sharing  the  cabinet  posts  in  a  way  that  mirrored  the  linguistic  and  political 
landscape. It is Swiss common sense that the old formula, in place from 1959 to 2004, had brought 
Switzerland stability and prosperity. Before December 2003, two Federal Counsellors were elected 
each from the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats, and the Free Democrats and one from the 
Swiss People's Party. Under the new magic formula starting in January 2004, the new party composition 
of  the  cabinet  changed  to:  1  Christian  Democrat,  2  Social  Democrats,  2  Free  Democrats,  and  2 
representatives of the Swiss People's Party of Christoph Blocher. 
28 On the origins of euroscepticism in German-speaking Switzerland see for instance Theiler (2004).   21 
Office (established in 1961) is still under the control of the Federal Department of 
Foreign  Affairs  (FDFA)  and  the  Federal  Department  of  Economic  Affairs  (FDEA) 
what may mirror the wish to go it alone  in all other areas than economy by the 
majority of the Swiss people but what is less easy for the government since European 
integration advanced. Rapprochements to the EU therefore are sometimes seen as an 
institutional  phasing-in,  as  integration  by  stealth  what  accounts  for  perpetuated 
alienation  of  the  classe  politique  and  the  people.  Indeed,  the  European  issue  has 
become  the  key  cleavage  in  Swiss  politics.  This  alienation  is  evidence  of 
Europeanisation  seen  as  modernisation  or  assimilation,  as  ‘a  process  whereby 
national political elites began to reconceive of national interests relative to a broader 
European  framework.  Europeanisation  …  emerged  as  a  modernisation  process 
spearheaded  by  national  political  and  bureaucratic  elites’  (Harmsen  and  Wilson, 
2000: 21) which only much later percolates more generally into Swiss society. 
 
Considering Europeanisation and the  changes  in Switzerland listed above by just 
looking at contemporary relations misses the bigger picture. But including history in 
Europeanisation  studies  allows  seeing  that  Switzerland  is  not  that  special  case 
(anymore)  and  overall  less  distinctive  than  commonly  –  also  in  the  Swiss  self-
perception – thought of. The changes Switzerland is undergoing today are not so 
new  but  in  many  aspects  rather  a  return  to  former  attempts  of  adaptation  and 
normalisation in international affairs. The establishment of an Integration Office in 
1961  meant  reforming  the  machinery  of  government  as  does  the  opening  of  a 
Delegation of the European Commission29 to Switzerland in March 2007 that is the 
most recent proof of normalisation by Europeanisation. Moreover, elite socialisation 
in European affairs, i.e. elite Europeanisation, is not only furthered by re-orientating 
the diplomatic service but as well by internationally operating business people that 
                                                 
29 These Delegations are under the control of the External Service and serve European Union interests 
throughout the world. There are 118 Delegations in third countries and five Delegations (in Geneva, 
New York, Paris, Rome and Vienna) at centres of international organisations (OECD, OSCE, UN and 
WTO).   22 
have to be well informed on Community rules, by Swiss judges that now have to be 
trained  in  EC  law,  and by  students  and  academics  that  are  Europeanised  due  to 
Switzerland’s  participation  in  the  European  Higher  Education  Area  (keywords: 
Bologna process, Erasmus, etc.). 
Like any other country Switzerland carries out its domestic adaptation ‘with national 
colours’  (Green-Cowles  et  al.,  2000:  1):  incrementally,  deliberately,  with  special 
regard to domestic cohesion, for broad consensus outranks accelerated progress in 
relations with the EU in order to prevent a referendum challenge. Assessing that 
‘Swiss ways are not always very open and competitive’ as  does Church  (2002[2]: 
142), ‘Europeanisation is a way of revitalising them.’ And of normalising them, one 
may add. 
The constant in all these changes is that the adjustments made at the Swiss national 
level in order to accommodate new situations predominately were and are directly 
linked  to  the  advancement  of  the  European  project,  thus  proving  the  hegemonic 
power of European unification by exertion of passive adaptational pressure which is 
observed  –  and  exaggerated  as  well  as  exploited  –  by  many  EU-phobes  and 
contributes to deep-rooted EU-scepticism among the Swiss.30 It is very likely that 
such  pressures  on  Switzerland  to  Europeanise  become  more  frequent  as  the 
European Union expands and integrates further.  
Moreover,  the  hegemonic  pressure  causes  the  government  to  embark  on  a  very 
careful communication strategy concerning EU-issues as recently observable in the 
controversy on company-tax advantages31: Hans-Rudolf Merz, minister of finance, 
said  that  it  would  be  dishonourable  for  a  sovereign  state  like  Switzerland  to 
negotiate with the EU on tax rules, but promptly announced an autonomous fiscal 
reform ‘that would fulfil the EU’s requirements’ (NZZ, 28/29 April 2007: 33). How 
                                                 
30 Most recently, the felt passive pressure by the European Union led Pirmin Schwander, president of 
AUNS, to accuse the EU even of ‘colonialism’ and ‘Euro-imperialism’ (Schwander, 2007: 5). Although 
this argument is used in a demagogic way in daily politics, it addresses the question of analysing 
today’s Europe as Empire for European Union studies as recently done by Jan Zielonka (2006). This too 
holds something for studying the Europeanisation of Switzerland. 
31 The European Commission, on 13 February 2007, accused Switzerland of offering unfair company-
tax advantages that violate the FTA of 1972, a complaint rejected by the Swiss.   23 
‘autonomous’ is a reform when linked to a demand by the European Union that has 
the power to suspend negotiations for cooperation in other desired areas like the 
electricity market or the agricultural free trade agreement? Or is it rather a reform 
answering Europeanisation? 
 
Outlook: Implications of the Swiss Example for European Union Studies 
 
The Swiss case contributes to redefining Europeanisation, especially when analysing 
the  impacts  of  the  emergence  and  the  development  at  the  EU  level  on  domestic 
structures.  If  we  were  interested  in  ‘whether  and  how  the  ongoing  process  of 
European integration has changed nation-states, their domestic institutions, and their 
political cultures’, as are Green Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2000: 1), we must not 
neglect  neither  non-member  states  nor  the  pre-membership  history  of  current 
member states. 
Depth and structure of Switzerland’s relationship with the unified Europe may be 
new but the Europeanisation of Switzerland itself is not. A more precise definition of 
the term that allows a look at the antecedents of the European Union and a functional 
approach that leaves aside formal membership but focuses on the adaptations made 
will also contribute to a better understanding of differentiated integration in the EU, 
a trend that will continue in the future. On the one hand enlargement already has 
and  will  further  increase  the  EU’s  heterogeneity  and  thereby  affecting  its 
effectiveness and its very character (Gstöhl, 2002: 223), on the other hand there will 
be more states that are Europeanised on a functional level – as is already Switzerland 
– without taking part in the institutions. Historical insight as delivered in this paper 
concerning  the  Swiss  way  may  serve  as  an  outlook  on  flexible  differentiated 
European integration in 50 years from now. Some will be full members while some 
will only share a few selected dimensions of the EU. Thinking for example of Turkey 
maybe being still no full member in 2057 but participating in selected areas of EU-
policy, the country won’t formally take part in EU-institutions but nevertheless it will   24 
be Europeanised since 100 years.32 Assuming differentiated integration the normal 
case of European integration in 50 years from now – what, above all, challenges the 
importance of full membership for European Union studies – Switzerland will be 
normal again.  
Even at this stage the Swiss example already reminds us ‘that integration in Europe 
is  a  broader  and  less  formal  process  than  some  EU  specialists  assume’  (Church, 
2002[1]: 15). Being inextricably linked to the unified Europe Switzerland has little 
alternative than to adapt to Community rules, but each step of adaptation is and will 
be conducted by the pace of incremental change in the Swiss system.  
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